Abortion and the Term "Human Being"

Some people believe that the abortion question can be decided by an appeal to straight forward syllogisms. They believe that such syllogisms employ simple moral and factual propositions that are expressed in clear and generally accepted terminology, and thereby render their pro-life conclusions irresistible. For example:

1. It is morally impermissible for human beings to kill other human beings (without justification);

2. By definition, a living human entity, pre-natal or post-natal, is a human being;

3. Abortion is a method of killing a human being - Abortion kills a human being;

Therefore;

4. It is morally impermissible to abort a living fetal entity (without justification).

This argument appears to be straight forward and compelling. But it is not. It is instead an example of the logical fallacy known as "begging the question" (or "circular reasoning").

"Begging the question" means "assuming what you're allegedly proving." If I argue that "everyone can't be famous, because everyone can't be well known," I'm uttering what sounds like a reasonable argument. But in reality, I'm saying that "everyone can't be famous, because everyone can't be famous (i.e., well known)." My premise (or reason for accepting the conclusion) is the conclusion itself, expressed differently.

Similarly, if I argue, "I met an angel last night" and then, when I am challenged, reply "he told me he was an angel and angels don't lie," I'm assuming (that it was an angel that I saw) in my argument that allegedly proves that it was an angel.


The test for determining whether an argument "begs the question" involves two steps:

(1) Identifying the question that is in dispute; then

(2) Looking to see if the answer an argument is defending (as its conclusion) is also one of the argument's premises.

Regarding step one, the pro-life vs pro-choice dispute is fundamentally about whether (or when) fetal life and post-fetal life share a comparable moral status. It is, after all, a person's moral status that anchors the moral prohibition against killing him. If (or when) fetal life and post-fetal life share the same moral status, killing either will be equally wrong.

So, the question in the abortion debate is, "when does fetal life have the same moral status as a post-natal life? Hard line anti-abortionists answer "at the moment of conception." Most pro-choice proponents answer "at some later point in the fetus' development, but long before birth." Hard line pro-choice proponents answer "as long as the fetus is in the womb."

(I consider myself to be non-hard line pro-choice).

Now that we know what the question is, we can check to see if the differing answers that the parties give to the question appear as one of their premises.

Pro-choice proponents cite what they say is a morally relevant distinction. They say that the non-existence of a “someone” in the earlier stages of fetal development, and the presence (or possible presence) of a “someone” in the latter stages of fetal development, provide grounds for drawing a moral distinction. Their argument is very simple. “No someone, no victim, no harm” on the one had, versus "someone, victim, harm," on the other.

Is this argument question begging? Not at all. Pro-choice proponents are not arguing that "the comparable moral status exists at some point after conception, because the comparable moral status exists at some point after conception." They're arguing that the feature that generates (or anchors) the prohibition against killing is our existence as a "someone," and that our existence as a "someone" does not occur until well after conception.

Note that I'm not saying that this argument is unassailable (although I think it is right). I'm saying that the argument is not question begging.

What about the pro-life argument?

The version we considered (above) goes as follows: (1) all human entities are “human beings"; (2) killing is a morally impermissible thing to do to another “human being"; (3) abortion is killing; therefore (4) abortion is a morally impermissible thing to do.

Is this argument question begging? Absolutely. Premise (1) lumps all human entities into a single category - "human being." Premise (2) assigns all members of that category the same moral status. The problem is that premise (2) assigns the same moral status to all of the members of the category "human being" without any argument whatsoever. The pro-life argument collapsed (or ignored) the key distinction that their pro-choice counterparts developed (and relied upon) without providing any explanation or argument as to why this distinction should be ignored. The pro-life argument, thus, works by obfuscation and sleight of hand. It simply ignores the distinction advanced by the pro-choicers without mentioning that it is ignoring that distinction.

By lumping all human entities together under the ambiguous term "human being," the pro-life argument imports the premise that all human entities have a comparable moral status. But, if you'll recall, the question in dispute (expressed a bit differently) was whether or not all human entities have an equal moral status (pro-life "yes . . . abortion is impermissible," pro-choice "no . . . abortion is permissible"). By embedding the "yes" answer within the argument's premises, the pro-life proponents "begged the question."


In short, Pro-lifers have been challenged to prove that all human entities (from zygotes to adults humans) share the same moral status. They cannot do so simply by embedding their "yes" answer as an implicit premise of a simple syllogism. They need to discredit the distinction drawn by pro-choice proponents between a human entity prior to the existence of a “someone,” and a human entity after a “someone” has emerged. If that distinction is irrelevant or misguided, they need to explain why.

So far, they have not done so (IMO). And it will be very difficult for them to do, given that the "someone" aspect of our existence is the part that we value.

Joe H.