The Sanctity of Life Argument

Last week, President Obama overturned the ban on federal funding for embryonic stem-cell research put in place by former President Bush. Its worth noting that seven out of ten Americans support federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. It is also extremely unlikely that those many millions of Americans believe that embryos are "someones" who can be murdered and nonetheless support federal funding for research that destroys embryos. This means that these Americans, like me, implicitly reject the Right to Life argument as applied to early fetal life.

That being said, the related conviction that human life is "sacred," expressed by anti-abortion groups claiming to defend the “sanctity of life,” is far less controversial. To be sacred a thing need only be thought to embody a significant degree of intrinsic value. Even non-living things such as flags, songs, scriptures, famous paintings, and natural wonders can be thought of as sacred. The claim that abortion is morally profane, even at the earliest stages of pregnancy, is far more credible than the "abortion is murder" claim. It is more reasonable to think that human life is unique and precious at every stage of its development, given what human life is, how it came to be, and what it can do, than it is to think that microscopic embryos are “subjects” who can be “murdered.”

Unfortunately, the sanctity of life argument is not nearly as powerful a justification for legal proscription of abortion as the right to life argument. Rights, after all, are well recognized moral trumps. A belief that a thing is sacred, to the contrary, although not without moral weight, is less significant, morally speaking. This is true for a number of reasons.

First, much of human opinion regarding what is "sacred" is inherently religious. For this reason, the premise that a thing or practice is sacred, and therefore inviolable, will rarely be universally accepted. Moreover, there is no way to reconcile antithetical religious convictions on such matters.

Second, even when people agree about what is sacred, they will often differ sharply about the proper way to show respect for the sanctity of that thing. Consider end of life decisions. Many people agree that human life is sacred in some sense or other. But these same people differ sharply about what follows from this premise. Some think the best way to show respect for the sanctity of human life is to preserve it as long as possible, regardless of the circumstances. Others think it profane to allow a life to deteriorate beyond recognition and usefulness.

Who is right? I'm not convinced we can know - both arguments are plausible. And both appeal equally to the notion that human life is sacred.

Third, in cases of significant disagreement about whether a thing is sacred, or disagreement about the proper way to honor the sacred, it is problematic for those holding a majority view to impose that view, by law, on those who reject it. Consider the following example. We agree that the right to life argument lacks moral force until week 13. We further agree that fetal life is sacred at all stages of its development, simply because it is human.

Now suppose that we discover at week eight that the fetus will develop into a child with extremely severe birth defects. One of us thinks the sacred status of the developing fetus requires us to preserve its life. The other thinks the sacred nature of human life (in conjunction with feelings of compassion for the entity's future suffering) requires that this particular life be terminated. Assuming that both opinions are plausible applications of the premise that human life is sacred, which I think they are, should one of us be allowed to use the law to impose our vision of the sacred and its proper application on the other (remembering that we are not talking about a right to life - only about what we personally consider the proper application of our conception of the sanctity of human life). Clearly not, it would seem. If resepect for the sacred is the sole basis for our disagreement, it would seem that each of us ought to be free to act from his or her own conscience.

Finally, it is widely recognized that circumstances sometimes justify our intruding upon the sacred. Jesus himself taught, by word and example, at numerous points in the New Testament, that concerns about human well being sometimes trump respect for sacred things. Regarding consecrated days of worship Jesus could not have put this point more clearly. “Man” he said “was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man!”

In summary, the premise that human life is sacred, at all stages, and is thus morally entitled to respect, is a plausible moral premise. But that premise seems inadequate to justify legal prohibitions.

Any thoughts?

Joe