By “legitimate,” of course, Akin meant “genuine.” His point was that rape exceptions (to
abortion restrictions) are unnecessary because pregnancies do not happen to
genuine rape victims. His darker point,
not explicitly stated but logically implied, is that every pregnant woman who
has claimed “rape” is lying – she is instead pregnant as the result of her own
voluntary decision and should, therefore, not be allowed to escape the
consequences of her actions.
That this is pseudo-science serving a harsh ideology is
undeniable. That it is a repugnant tactical
move (shaming pregnant women who allege rape) designed to exonerate an
extremist political posture (forcing rape victims to carry their rapist’s fetus
to term) is equally obvious. But what
interests me is why hard-core pro lifers – those who wish to criminalize all
abortions without exception – resort to such silly, repugnant arguments. Why don’t they just stick to their
“personhood” argument? After all, if you
believe that a fetus is a “person” from the moment of conception, you have a
rather straight-forward argument in favor of banning abortions – namely,
abortion kills someone who has a right to life.
I suspect there are two reasons. First, very few people believe that a zygote
is a “person” or a “someone.” Given the
way we use those words, and what we normally mean when we use them, a
multi-celled entity, however “human” and “alive,” does not qualify as a
“person.” Granted, some people
disagree. But in cases of such
disagreement, there really isn’t anything to say. When I meet people who insist that zygotes
are “persons” or “someone’s” – and, as a Christian, I have met numerous people
who took this position – I simply say that we’re using these terms in
fundamentally different ways. If you
think a zygote is a “person” or a “someone,” fine. Given what I mean when I use these terms, I
don’t.
BTW, even people who believe that zygotes are “persons”
often argue on safer ground. Consider
the claim that “human life begins at conception.” This
statement has the virtue of being undoubtedly true. It has the additional virtue of substituting
the term “human life” for the term “someone.”
The apparent strategy is to get the concession on “human life,” and to
then suggest that “human life” necessarily implies “someone’s life.”
What this argument strategy implicitly denies is the
possibility that an entity could be (1) alive, and (2) human, and (3) not (yet)
a someone. But to most people, upon
reflection, this appears to be a distinct possibility. Consider the millions of fertilized human embryos
currently stored in freezers. One day
they might be unfrozen, implanted in a womb, and develop into a baby born to a
loving mother. Such embryos are
certainly human. They are also alive. But are they a “someone?” Are there millions of “persons” in the
freezers?
If you think the answer is “no,” as I do, then you can see
why the argument “life begins at conception” does not save the personhood
rationale. That is because the
description “not someone” is compatible with “alive” and “human.”
Additionally, there is a strong possibility that the
“personhood” argument is not nearly as strong as it initially looks. That is, even if one concedes that an embryo
is a “person” from the moment of conception, it may not follow that abortion is
morally impermissible, or that it should be outlawed. On this point I’ll leave you to peruse the
most famous (and arguably the most enjoyable) philosophical article ever
written on this topic by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson.
Joe Huster
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