More on Plantinga's "Evil Proves the Existence of God" Argument

Plantinga’s “Evil proves the existence of God” argument works only if the existence of God is required to create what we call “morality.” If there is a non theistic basis for morality, then we’re back to square one regarding our need to develop a theodicy.

In determining whether the existence of God is a necessary condition for morality, our first task is to define “morality.” This is not as easy as it might seem. Almost all proposed definitions of morality contain an element of circularity, and circular definitions are not definitions in any meaningful sense.

Fortunately, examining Plantinga’s argument does not require a philosophically airtight definition of morality. Therefore, we can think of morality as “the set of rules - including decision making rules, principles, practices and habits that, when applied correctly in the appropriate contexts, lead human beings to act as they should toward themselves, each other, and toward our environment.”

Did you see the circularity? The word “should.” . . . Anyway . . .

Assuming that morality exists and has real authority over human conduct, the first question to ask is, “what is its basis?” What makes right (or good, or permissible) acts right (or good, or permissible), and what makes wrong (or bad, or impermissible) acts wrong (or bad, or impermissible)?

The traditional Christian answer has been that God determines what is moral and immoral. The simple version of this answer, known as the “Divine Command theory” (“DCT”), proved difficult for Euthyphro in his discussion with Socrates - particularly when Socrates reminded Euthyphro that, by his own reckoning, there are numerous Gods constantly quarreling with each other about moral issues. But the answer fares no better when the Gods unite in agreement - e g., when they become one. I’ll leave you all to enjoy Plato’s argument for yourself and merely state that defining morality in terms of what God wants or commands, leads to the obvious question of why God wants or commands us as he does? God either has reasons for his commands, in which case morality is more accurately a product of those reasons. Or God has no reasons for his commands, in which case morality is a product of divine whim, changeable from moment to moment.

By the way, Christians often get angry when I point this out. What they fail to notice is that the DCT is refuted by the scriptures themselves. In the account of Abraham’s discussion with God about God’s plan to destroy the city of Sodom, Abraham immediately noted that God’s plan was morally flawed, given that it (potentially) punished the righteous with the wicked. Abraham then asks, “shall not the God of all the earth do justice?”

God eventually agreed with Abraham’s moral criticism, but that’s not the key point. Nor is it important that God, on most interpretations, was merely testing Abraham and knew what was right all along. The key point is that, if the DCT were correct, God’s plans - whatever they were - would be beyond moral critique. God could not act immorally under the DCT no matter how he acted, because the DCT holds that God’s acts (or commands) define morality. The fact that God can be portrayed as planning to do something immoral completely destroys the DCT. That Abraham can coherently ask whether God is going to do justice, similarly destroys the DCT.

So God himself has revealed that morality is not merely a function of God’s commands. That’s something! But it only helps us a little. It proves that God’s existence is not a sufficient condition for - or explanation of - morality. But it does not tell us what morality is or what supplies it with its authority over human conduct. Nor does it refute Plantinga, who argued that the existence of God was a necessary (rather than sufficient) condition of morality.

In my next post on this subject I will develop an account of morality that is: (1) compatible with the idea that morality ultimately comes from God and is anchored in God’s purposes; but (2) which is equally compatible with the belief that morality is not dependent on God for its existence. If I succeed, I will have refuted Plantinga - and broken the draw regarding the problem of evil. But I’ll also have given my fellow believers a more workable account of the relationship between God and morality.

Stay tuned.

Joe