Argument from Evil to God - Does it Work? Part 1

In the book “Reason for God,” the author repeats an argument by Alvin Plantinga which amounts to a jiujitsu reversal of the standard argument from evil. This argument is worth exploring at some length.

The standard argument from evil is that the existence of evil, or pain, or suffering, or the existence of so much evil, pain, and suffering, is incompatible with the existence of an: (1) all-knowing; (2) all-loving; and (3) all-powerful God. If God exists, the argument goes, he lacks at least one of these three capacities. But if God lacks even one of these capacities, his existence is nothing to get excited about.

Plantinga responds, “fair enough, my atheist friend, but you’ve got a problem of your own.” If there is no God, and all events are simply natural events, unguided by any supernatural agency, then you have no basis for calling such events "evil." You may not like the phenomena you call evil, but in citing these phenomena as your basis for rejecting the traditional monotheistic deity, you are saying much more than ‘we don’t like these phenomena.’ You are saying that they are morally repugnant. But what is the basis for your MORAL judgment? How can you morally condemn purely natural phenomena? As Hume famously put it, no ought follows from an is. No moral obligations can be derived from a description of what is? “Ought” and “is” are entirely separate categories - the fact that the entire world should perish except I move my finger slightly produces no obligation that I act to save the world. If I have such an obligation, it has to be based on something other than the mere fact that the world is going to perish.

The truth, my atheist friend, is that, in making your argument from evil, you are relying on a moral foundation that is metaphysical, e.g., beyond nature. Your argument against God presupposes that the universe is subject to moral critique. But this can only be true if there is something beyond it - something supernatural that is capable of grounding moral judgments . . . something like . . . God.”

Go suck on that Atheists!

Now, if Plantinga is right, we have both a paradox and an argumentative “draw.” An argument that proves God can’t exist necessarily presupposes that he must exist. As we used to say in the seventies - which is the last time I smoked the wild weed - "WOW MAAAAAAAN!"

And I’m pretty sure Plantinga will settle for a draw on the argument from evil. A draw against theism's most dangerous threat . . . done!

Question is, does Plantings' argument work?

I don’t think so. I’ll explain why in a subsequent post.

Disclaimer - I did my best to reconstruct Plantinga’s argument. However, I did this from memory, which is faulty. I no longer have Plantinga’s book. Moreover, I am no longer teaching philosophy, so I’m not going to go to the university and retrieve it. I don’t remember Plantinga citing Hume, but Hume’s point is germane, so I included it.

My point is, I may have omitted something important, or something that would strengthen the argument. If so, feel free to point this out.

Joe H.