The Experts

Sorry about my absence. I was wracked up with the flu for a few days.

About 20 years ago, Jonathan Rauch wrote a book called "Kindly Inquisitors," which I highly recommend. In that book, Rauch noted that we routinely threaten people with punitive sanctions to force them to take measures that we believe are appropriate. For example, we have tried, convicted and sentenced people for allowing their children to die from infections that ordinary antibiotics would have cured. Rauch then asked, what justifies our doing this? What can we say to someone who sincerely believes that prayer alone is the most promising treatment for their children? How can we justify forcing them to act as we think they should act regarding their children's health? Is our force a legitimate use of state power, or are these parents simply political prisoners?

Among other things - such as a plausible political theory - the answer to this question will hinge on what we can credibly claim to "know."

In my last post, I suggested that while I personally possessed knowledge in only a few limited areas, I am nonetheless justified in forming opinions in other areas, provided that the factual basis for my opinions are the consensus of the experts. I also criticized the practice of those lacking the relevant expertise of dismissing expert opinion, when what the experts say conflicts with the dismissers' ideologically based beliefs. I stand by these views, and offer a short summary of Rauch's explanation.

In a nutshell, modern inquiry is conducted under the following set of rules:

1. No one has the authority to declare what is true or false;

2. No one has the authority to dismiss or otherwise declare a criticism of the prevailing wisdom inappropriate or off limits;

3. Anyone can criticize any opinion or belief - no belief is immune from criticism;

4. There is never a final say - all beliefs, no matter how well settled, can be challenged.

5. For the purpose of public action - i.e., for the purpose of determining which ideas we will publicly finance in our research, place into our laws, or state in our text books - only those propositions that gain a wide consensus among those qualified to state opinions on the particular issue in question, pursuant to a process of inquiry governed by the first four rules, will count as knowledge.

The basic idea is that a proposition constituting a wide scientific consensus, pursuant to a process by which that proposition has been subject to unfettered and unlimited scrutiny, has a greater claim on our epistemological allegiance than a proposition that has not been subjected to such scrutiny, or which has failed to garner widespread consensus.

Three things. First, "scientific" is defined very loosely in this argument. It covers all disciplines which apply rationally rigorous methods. Historians have established methods - I don't know what they are - I told you I was ignorant - for determining which historical explanations are plausible and which are not. Provided that historical inquiry is conducted pursuant to the same set of rules, historical interpretations that achieve widespread consensus among historians have a greater claim to our allegiance - we are justified in putting them in the text books.

Second, a widespread consensus of experts does not guarantee accuracy - hence rule no. 4.

Third, knowledge has traditionally been defined as "justified true belief." This meant that to know something, one had to have reasons sufficient to justify one's belief. Under our modern system of knowing, the justification has migrated from individual judgment to the collective judgment of those who have spent the time and energy necessary to master a particular area. This theory of knowledge combines expertise, unlimited criticism, and consensus. It is not perfect, but it is the best we can do in a world in which there is way too much knowledge for any one person to master.

So, it turns out that we have something to say to the parents who want to deny their children antibiotics. We can say to them, we have tested the hypothesis that "prayer only" works better than "prayer plus antibiotics," and the overwhelming consensus of the experts is that the latter is far more effective than the former. Given this overwhelming consensus, we cannot allow you place your childrens' lives at risk from an illness we have good reasons to believe is curable.

Why am I entitled to believe that human activity is warming the earth? Because that is the overwhelming consensus of the experts, achieved pursuant to a process of inquiry governed by the four rules. I am justified because I'm putting my trust in a very reliable (albeit imperfect) method.

But without the experts, I am as ignorant as a rock.

Those who dismiss such experts as "loons" are putting their trust in . . . ?

Joe H.